Mapping words to the world: Adults, but not children, understand how mismatching descriptions refer.

How do children learn to connect expressions (e.g., "that red apple") to the real-world objects they refer to? The dominant view in developmental psychology is that children rely on descriptive information, "red" and "apple." In contrast, linguistic theories of the adult language attribute primacy to grammatical elements: words such as "that" or "another" first establish the status of potential referents within the discourse context (old or new) before descriptions can factor in. These theories predict that reference can succeed even when the description does not match the referent. We explored this novel prediction in adults and children. Over four experiments, we found that (a) adults relied on the articles to identify the referent, even when the description did not fit, consistent with grammar-first accounts; (b) consistent with description-first accounts, and unlike adults, 3- to 5-year-old children prioritized the descriptions provided by nouns and adjectives, despite being sensitive to grammatical information. This suggests that children connect expressions to referents differently from adults. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Images of objects are interpreted as symbols: A case study of automatic size measurement.

Are photographs of objects presented on a screen in an experimental context treated as the objects themselves or are they interpreted as symbols standing for objects? We addressed this question by investigating the size Stroop effect-the finding that people take longer to judge the relative size of two pictures when the real-world size of the depicted objects is incongruent with their display size. In Experiment 1, we replicated the size Stroop effect with new stimuli pairs (e.g., a zebra and a watermelon). In Experiment 2, we replaced the large objects in Experiment 1 with small toy objects that usually stand for them (e.g., a toy zebra), and found that the Stroop effect was driven by what the toys stood for, not by the toys themselves. In Experiment 3, we showed that the association between an image of a toy and the object the toy typically stands for is not automatic: when toys were pitted against the objects they typically represent (e.g., a toy zebra vs. a zebra), images of toys were interpreted as representations of small objects, unlike in Experiment 2. We argue that participants interpret images as discourse-bound symbols and automatically compute what the images stand for in the discourse context of the experimental situation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Individuation of agents based on psychological properties in 10 month-old infants.

What makes agents fundamentally different from each other from the viewpoint of a 10-month-old infant? While infants at this age can already individuate human-like objects from non-humanlike ones and self-propelled agents from inert objects, little is known of when and how they start individuating within the domain of agents. What is clear from previous studies is that differences in surface and dynamic features are not sufficient. We hypothesized that mental properties-in this case the agents' preferences-can serve as an individuating property. In our study, we familiarized infants with two animated agents who had different preferences. The agents sequentially and repeatedly emerged from behind an occluder, and then each agent approached one of two target objects before returning behind the occluder. After familiarization, the occluder was lifted, revealing either one agent or two agents. While infants successfully individuated the agents in the preference-demonstration condition, they failed to do so in the exposure-only condition in which perceptually similar surface and dynamic features of the agents were presented but without indicating preferences. Our study thus provides evidence that mental properties can help individuate agents, grounding the claim that infants understand agents as mental entities at their core.

Twelve-month-olds disambiguate new words using mutual-exclusivity inferences.

Representing objects in terms of their kinds enables inferences based on the long-term knowledge made available through kind concepts. For example, children readily use lexical knowledge linked to familiar kind concepts to disambiguate new words (e.g., "find the toma"): they exclude members of familiar kinds falling under familiar kind labels (e.g., a ball) as potential referents and link new labels to available unfamiliar objects (e.g., a funnel), a phenomenon dubbed as 'mutual exclusivity'. Younger infants' failure in mutual exclusivity tasks has been commonly interpreted as a limitation of early word-learning or inferential abilities. Here, we investigated an alternative explanation, according to which infants do not spontaneously represent familiar objects under kind concepts, hence lacking access to the information necessary for rejecting them as referents of novel labels. Building on findings about conceptual development and communication, we hypothesized that nonverbal communication could prompt infants to set up kind-based representations which, in turn, would promote mutual exclusivity inferences. This hypothesis was tested in a looking-while-listening task involving novel word disambiguation. Twelve-month-olds saw pairs of objects, one familiar and one unfamiliar, and heard familiar kind labels or novel words. Across two experiments providing a cross-lab replication in two different languages, infants successfully disambiguated novel words when the familiar object had been pointed at before labeling, but not when it had been highlighted in a non-communicative manner (Experiment 1) or not highlighted at all (Experiment 2). Nonverbal communication induced infants to recruit kind-based representations of familiar objects that they failed to recruit in its absence and that, once activated, supported mutual-exclusivity inferences. Developmental changes in children's appreciation of communicative contexts may modulate the expression of early inferential and word learning competences.

Enhanced encoding of the co-actor's target stimuli during a shared non-motor task.

Task co-representation has been proposed to rely on the motor brain areas' capacity to represent others' action plans similarly to one's own. The joint memory (JM) effect suggests that working in parallel with others influences the depth of incidental encoding: Other-relevant items are better encoded than non-task-relevant items. Using this paradigm, we investigated whether task co-representation could also emerge for non-motor tasks. In Experiment 1, we found enhanced recall performance to stimuli relevant to the co-actor also when the participants' task required non-motor responses (counting the target words) instead of key-presses. This suggests that the JM effect did not depend on simulating the co-actor's motor responses. In Experiment 2, direct visual access to the co-actor and his actions was found to be unnecessary to evoke the JM effect in case of the non-motor, but not in case of the motor task. Prior knowledge of the co-actor's target category is sufficient to evoke deeper incidental encoding. Overall, these findings indicate that the capacity of task co-representation extends beyond the realm of motor tasks: Simulating the other's motor actions is not necessary in this process.

Social category formation is induced by cues of sharing knowledge in young children.

Previous research has shown that human infants and young children are sensitive to the boundaries of certain social groups, which supports the idea that the capacity to represent social categories constitutes a fundamental characteristic of the human cognitive system. However, the function this capacity serves is still debated. We propose that during social categorization the human mind aims at mapping out social groups defined by a certain set of shared knowledge. An eye-tracking paradigm was designed to test whether two-year-old children differentially associate conventional versus non-conventional tool use with language-use, reflecting an organization of information that is induced by cues of shared knowledge. Children first watched videos depicting a male model perform goal-directed actions either in a conventional or in a non-conventional way. In the test phase children were presented with photographs taken of the model and of a similarly aged unfamiliar person while listening to a foreign (Experiment 1) or a native language (Experiment 2) text. Upon hearing the foreign utterance children looked at the model first if he had been seen to act in an unconventional way during familiarization. In contrast, children looked at the other person if the model had performed conventional tool use actions. No such differences were found in case of the native language. The results suggest that children take the conventionality of behavior into account in forming representations about a person, and they generalize to other qualities of the person based on this information.